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Performance degradationAbstract Actuation system is a vital system in an aircraft, providing the force necessary to move
flight control surfaces. The system has a significant influence on the overall aircraft performance
and its safety. In order to further increase already high reliability and safety, Airbus has imple-
mented a dissimilar redundancy actuation system (DRAS) in its aircraft. The DRAS consists of
a hydraulic actuation system (HAS) and an electro-hydrostatic actuation system (EHAS), in which
the HAS utilizes a hydraulic source (HS) to move the control surface and the EHAS utilizes an elec-
trical supply (ES) to provide the motion force. This paper focuses on the performance degradation
processes and fault monitoring strategies of the DRAS, establishes its reliability model based on the
generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN), and carries out a reliability assessment considering the
fault monitoring coverage rate and the false alarm rate. The results indicate that the proposed reli-
ability model of the DRAS, considering the fault monitoring, can express its fault logical relation
and redundancy degradation process and identify potential safety hazards.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of Chinese Society of Aeronautics
and Astronautics. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
As one of the key subsystems in aircraft, the actuation system
is mainly used to transmit and distribute secondary energypower and conduct actuations, accomplishing flight control
and operation by fulfilling preset missions. If a failure has
occurred in the system, a minor outcome could result in a
failed mission, but a disastrous outcome can result in fatal
plane crash. Therefore, the performance and reliability of the
actuation system are of critical importance to aircraft safety,
maneuverability, and flight quality.1,2
In order to improve the reliability and safety of an actua-
tion system, the dissimilar redundancy technology has been
widely adopted in modern aircraft design.3,4 Airbus 380 was
the first aircraft to introduce a system with a combination of
dissimilar hydraulic power/electronic power and hydraulic
Nomenclature
Abbreviation Meaning
DRAS dissimilar redundant actuation system
DMM dynamic Markov model
M motor
EN evidential networks
DFTA dynamic fault tree analysis
MSS multi-state system
FMD fault monitoring devices
FMCR failure monitoring coverage rate
MCR monitoring coverage rate
GSPN generalized stochastic Petri nets
HA hydraulic actuator
HS hydraulic source
HAS hydraulic actuation system including HA and HS
EHA electro-hydraulic actuator
ES electrical supply
EHAS electro-hydraulic actuation system including EHA
and ES
DFM direct failure mode
GFM gradual failure mode
CTMC continuous-time Markov chain
GSPNHAS description for GSPN-based reliability model of
HAS
GSPNEHAS description for GSPN-based reliability model
of EHAS
HSup operational state of HS
HSdn failed state of HS
HAeup equivalent operational state of HA
HAedn equivalent failed state of HA
HASup operational state of HAS
HASdn failed state of HAS
ESup operational state of ES
ESdn failed state of ES
EHAeup equivalent operational state of EHA
EHAedn equivalent failed state of EHA
EHASup operational state of EHAS
EHASdn failed state of HAS
EHASbp back-up state of EHAS
GSPNDRAS description for GSPN-based reliability model
of DRAS
DRASup operational state of DRAS
DRASdn failed state of DRAS
HAS=EHASud state that undetected failure existed in
HAS/EHAS
HAS=EHASfd state that failures are detected in HAS/
EHAS
HAS=EHASfa state that false alarm occurred in HAS/
EHAS
HAS=EHASnfa state that no false alarm occurred in HAS/
EHAS
HAS=EHASvup HAS/EHAS is in operational state from
the view of detection signal
HAS=EHASvdn HAS/EHAS is in failure state from the
view of detection signal
HAlf light failure state of HA
HAmf middle failure state of HA
HAsf secure failure state of HA
Variable Meaning
i input current of HA
u input voltage of EHA
h deflection angle of the control surface
k failure rate
l repair rate
Pm monitoring coverage probability of FMD
Pfa false alarm probability of FMD
SHAS=EHAS=DRAS marking vector of GSPN for HAS/EHAS/
DRAS
SIDEAL state space of DRAS in an ideal situation with no
FMD
MHAS0=EHAS0=DRAS0 initial states of S in HAS/EHAS/
DRAS
KHAS=EHAS=DRAS capacities of each element in
SHAS=EHAS=DRAS
THASt=EHASt timed transition set of GSPN for HAS or
EHAS
KHAS=EHAS Transition rate set associate with THASt=EHASt
THASit=EHASit immediate transition set of GSPN for HAS or
EHAS
T dynamic transition behavior set
M0 initial identification of a system in GSPN model
F arc set of GSPN
W arc weight set of GSPN
Sd marking set to express whether the fault of HAS/
EHAS is detected or false alarm occurred
Sv marking set to describe if HAS/EHAS is normal
from the view of detection signal
SINT Integral state space of DRAS with FMD
Peup equivalent operational probability of HA
Pedn equivalent failure probability of HA
ke equivalent failure rate of HA
800 S. Wang et al.actuators/electro-hydrostatic actuators aiming to avoid severe
outcomes resulting from common cause failures in the actua-
tion system.5 Although the dissimilar redundant technology
has enhanced system mission reliability, it has also increased
the overall complexity due to the multiple redundancy design.
Shi et al.6 analyzed a triplex-redundancy airborne hydraulic
actuation system and found that the number of system states
has increased nine times due to the applications of redundancy
techniques. In addition to the normal operating and complete
failure states, the system is loaded with a great number of per-formance degrading states. In other words, the redundancy
design in the power and actuation system makes an aircraft
experience significant redundancy and performance degrada-
tion processes. The redundancy degradation affects not only
the general performance, but also the general availability of
the system because there are very complicated transitions
within the redundancy degradation and between normal and
fault states. It is concluded from the analysis of redundancy
system failure mechanisms that the degradation failure
process is closely related to the system architecture, equipment
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Therefore, in order to gain better understanding of the reliabil-
ity advantages of the DRAS, it is essential to conduct compre-
hensive research on all possible system states and transition
paths from normal state to complete failure state.
Traditional reliability modeling methods, reliability block
diagram (RBD) and fault tree analysis (FTA), construct logic
relations between component reliability and system reliability
in accordance with the system structural composition and
function, but they fail to represent the dynamic redundancy
degradation and state transitions of DRAS. In addition, NP-
hard problem occurs when we calculate the minimum cut set
of a large fault tree, as presented by Nystrom et al.7 Yang et al.8
applied evidential networks (EN) approach to the problem of
the reliability of a redundant servo actuation system. His
approach could not describe existing states and dynamic tran-
sitioning while the system is working. Distefano9 and Ranjbar
et al.10 presented the analytical method of system dynamic reli-
ability, and employed the dynamic Markov model (DMM) to
illustrate states and behavior of the system. The authors
approach was based on two-state assumption (normal and
failed), which is unable to demonstrate in detail the entire
degradation process from full-up state to failure. As the num-
ber of system components linearly increase, the system’s state
space will experience exponential increase, which means that
DMM has exponential complexity.11 DRAS is a typical
multi-state system (MSS) performing its task with degraded
performance levels. Levitin12 proposed the universal generat-
ing function (UGF) method for MSS reliability analysis. A
comprehensive review of MSS reliability theory and its appli-
cations can be found in the work by Lisnianski and Levitin,13
where different approaches for assessing MSS reliability are
presented in detail. An extension of Boolean models to the
multi-valued case, stochastic process and Monto-Carlo simula-
tion are also highlighted by Liu and Huang.14 However, these
methods could not describe the performance of FMD, which is
necessary in DRAS. Yao3 proposed a dynamic fault tree anal-
ysis model (DFTA) of an airplane fly-by-wire system. The
approach included the dynamic timing of system failures, but
did not consider state transition paths of the system redun-
dancy degradation.
Furthermore, to ensure proper functioning of DRAS,
FMDs are included in DRAS. FMD monitors the system
states in real time, and isolates and cuts out faulty units. Mul-
tiple factors, including detection precision, layout of sensors,
selection of failure thresholds, and other external interferences,
collectively affect the performance of FMD. The performance
of FMD is commonly denoted by failure monitoring coverage
probability and false alarm probability. In actual application
with monitoring coverage rate limits, FMD are unable to
100% correctly detect and isolate DRAS, which may have sig-
nificant impact on the system safety. In extreme cases, failing
to detect a fatal fault (complete failure in a single channel,
HAS or EHAS, in DRAS) may cause disastrous consequences.
However, when false alarms occur in FMD, it does not neces-
sarily mean that all alarms or transitions are responses to real
systemic faults, but rather, perfect or comparatively sound
devices may be mistakenly switched off, thus lowering the uti-
lization of the DRAS and affecting the mission reliability of
the system. As a result, FMD often becomes the weak link
in the entire redundancy system design.15 The advantages of
GSPN resulted in development of a triplex-redundancyhydraulic actuation system. The related reliability model of
three parallel hydraulic actuators revealed how failure detec-
tion rates affected system reliability on the basis of the redun-
dancy architecture, according to Shi et al.6 However, they did
not discuss degradation of actuator performance, nor false
alarms from FMD.
The DRAS, in general, experiences performance degrading
processes and fault sequences, different redundancy monitor-
ing transition strategies, and potential faults which have signif-
icant impact on the system reliability. Thus, there is a need to
develop a method to model the reliability of DRAS with fault
monitoring. The Markov process10, which is commonly
applied for system reliability modeling, requires pre-
definition for all state transitions when it is used in analyzing
performance degradation and fault dynamic sequence, which
makes the problem difficult to solve. The problem of using
the Markov process approach to DRAS with monitoring
devices is even more difficult due to significant complexity of
the system. For such a complex system, to pre-define accu-
rately all potential states is virtually impossible and any minor
change in the system structure would require significant effort
to reconfigure the model. Additional difficulty is presented by
the fact that the current reliability model cannot manifest
potential safety hazards due to introduction of FMD. There-
fore, it is important to propose a new model applicable to
the reliability and safety analysis of DRAS. GSPN is a model-
ing and analysis tool for distributed systems, particularly sui-
ted to describe the order, concurrency, conflict, and
synchronous relationship of the process or component in a sys-
tem. Meanwhile, as a special directed network, Petri net can
reflect state changes and provide intuitive development of a
system by means of a graphic model.16–19
This paper firstly studies the state transitions in the light of
the characteristics of DRAS. A reliability model is constructed
and solved using GSPN, and then the weak link of the dissim-
ilar redundant system is identified. The detection probability
and false alarm probability are considered as FMD is calcu-
lated, and the system fault logical relation and redundancy
degrading process are presented. Finally, the causes and prob-
ability of potential safety hazards are analyzed, and the meth-
ods for improvement of system safety are discussed.2. Reliability modeling for the dissimilar redundancy actuation
system
The architecture and block diagram of a DRAS is shown in
Fig. 1, where the power supply includes hydraulic power
(HS) and electric power (ES), and its actuation system is com-
posed of an HA and an EHA. Energy for the HA is supplied
by a central hydraulic power unit, whereas the EHA has inte-
grated electric power and local hydraulic units. The system
represents a typical dissimilar redundancy architecture in
terms of power supply and actuation system.20,21
As indicated in Fig. 1, the HAS consists of central hydraulic
power supply (HS) and a hydraulic actuator (HA) including a
servo valve and a hydraulic cylinder. The EHAS consists of
electric power (ES) and an electro-hydraulic actuator (EHA)
including a piston pump and a hydraulic cylinder. An FMD
is set up in each channel to guarantee safe and reliable opera-
tion, early fault detection, timely fault isolation, and rapid
maintenance of system failures. Normally, the HAS works
Fig. 1 Architecture and principle block diagram of DRAS.
Table 1 System state definition.
States Description
1 HAS operates and EHAS standby normally: DRAS is
normal
2 HAS breaks down and is correctly detected, and then
EHAS operates: DRAS redundancy degrading
3 False alarm occurs as HAS normally operates, and then
EHAS is switched into the system: DRAS redundancy
802 S. Wang et al.alone as a primary driver of control surfaces, while the EHAS
serves as a backup to the HAS. The hydraulic cylinder of the
EHA is in a back-up state with two hydraulic chambers con-
nected. If the HAS breaks down and its failure is correctly
detected, the failed HAS will be isolated and cut off, which will
cause the EHAS to carry on the mission of actuating control
surfaces. If the EHAS is to malfunction, the aircraft will have
to substitute it with other control surface combinations to real-
ize the flight control.degrading
4 Both HAS and EHAS break down and are correctly
detected, in this case DRAS loses its function completely:
DRAS failed
5 HAS breaks down and is correctly detected, however, false
alarm occurs as EHAS operates normally: DRAS becomes
invalid
6 False alarm occurs as HAS and EHAS operate normally:
DRAS becomes invalid
7 False alarm occurs as HAS operates normally, and EHAS
experiences breakdown and is correctly detected: DRAS
becomes invalid
8 False alarm occurs as HAS operates normally, and EHAS
experiences breakdown but is not detected: DRAS is in
danger
9 HAS breaks down and is correctly detected, furthermore,
EHAS breaks down but is not detected: DRAS is in danger
10 HAS breaks down but is not detected, and HAS fails:
DRAS in danger
11 HAS operates, while EHAS experiences breakdown and is
under maintenance: DRAS redundancy degrading
12 HAS operates, but the fault in EHAS is not detected, that
is false backup: DRAS redundancy degrading
13 HAS operates, and EHAS is normal but is mistaken for
fault: DRAS redundancy degrading2.1. State transition analysis of the dissimilar redundancy system
Deriving from the DRAS working principle and its failure
occurrence and development process, we use kHAS and kEHAS
to represent the failure rate for the HAS and the EHAS,
respectively, as well as lHAS and lEHAS as repair rates. Pm
and Pfa represent the monitoring coverage probability and
the false alarm probability of FMD. Then the main DRAS
states can be defined as indicated in Table 1.
Based on the above state definitions, DRAS state transition
relations are illustrated by Fig. 2. The figure represents a dia-
gram of state transitions based on the Markov process. It
depicts the system redundancy degradation and failure pro-
cesses. In the DRAS, an FMD is required to detect the work-
ing states of HAS and EHAS, whereas in a single HAS or
EHAS, an FMD is not required. Here, Pm represents the mon-
itoring coverage probability of FMD and Pfa represents the
false alarm probability of FMD.
DRAS states, in Fig. 2, are divided into three groups. The
first group, represented with solid circles, includes DRAS func-
tional states (1, 2, 3, 11, 12, and 13). State 1, represented with
two concentric solid circles, means that HAS operates and
EHAS is in standby mode normally. States 2, 3, 11, 12, and
13 are DRAS redundancy degradation states and are repre-
sented with a single solid circle. The second group of states,
represented with dashed line circles, includes DRAS complete
failure states (4, 5, 6, and 7). The third group of states, repre-
sented with triangles, includes DRAS potential hazardous
states (8, 9, and 10). The probability on the edge between
two nodes indicates the state transfer probability. As the states
are clearly described in Table 1, it is straightforward to under-
stand the parameters, the failure rate k and the maintenance
rate l of the components (HAS and EHAS), as well as the
monitoring coverage probability Pm and the false alarm prob-
ability Pfa of FMD in DRAS.If the failure detection threshold value set in FMD is too
high, or if FMD is out of order, an actual HAS failure may
not be detected correctly. As a result, DRAS will not be able
to cut off the failed HAS and switch operation to EHAS. In
this case, the control surface driven by DRAS will be out of
control, and the aircraft will be in a hazard state. This partic-
ular failure of DRAS is described as a transition from state 1
to state 10, as shown in Fig. 2. Alternately, if the failure of
EHAS is not detected due to FMD’s incomplete detection cov-
erage of DRAS in state 3, the control surface driven by DRAS
may also be out of control, and the aircraft will be in a hazard
state. This failure process of DRAS is described as a transition
Fig. 2 DRAS state transitions based on the Markov process.
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detection and false alarm of FMD can create potential safety
problems to the aircraft, affecting aircraft safety and its relia-
bility. Furthermore, when DRAS is in state 1, HAS may be
wrongly cut off and switched to state 3 because of the false
alarm of FMD or occasional intermittent interferences. At that
instant, if the EHA also reports a false alarm, then the overall
system will soon be regarded as in a fault state. Transitions 1-
3-7/6 and 1-2-5 show that false alarms can cause DRAS to
drop into failure sooner, reduce the system utilization, and
have negative effect on mission-accomplishing reliability. Con-
sequently, when establishing a reliability model for DRAS, the
FMD performance factor is of vital importance to the accu-
racy of the model.
The Markov model approach is unable to reveal the work-
ing states of internal components in HAS and EHAS. The
multiple states and complicated models render the solution
of the Markov model even more difficult. Furthermore, both
HAS and EHAS are closed-loop control systems, the perfor-
mance of which may downgrade with an increase in service
time.22 Therefore, the reliability model of HAS/EHAS cannot
be simply described with two states (i.e., operational and
failed). Failure of HAS/EHAS can be divided into two modes:
direct failure mode (DFM) and gradual failure mode (GFM).
DFM is a failure mode in which a failure once occurs will
directly cause failure in HAS and/or EHAS. In the case of
HAS, typical DFMs include short-circuiting and disconnect
of servo valve coil, seizing of the servo valve spool or hydraulic
cylinder, and fatigue failure of the piston rod. Alternately, in
the case of EHAS, typical DFMs include motor winding
short-circuiting and disconnect, and damage of core insula-
tion. GFM is a progressive failure mode, where the develop-
ment and occurrence of GFM happen over a period of time.
This failure mode includes failures such as leakage caused by
the wear of hydraulic cylinders, abrasion of servo valve spools,
and parameter fluctuation of various system components. The
Markov model which takes into account the failure features of
HAS/EHAS becomes unwieldy, thus making finding the solu-
tion increasingly difficult, and thus GSPN is introduced. A
continuous-time GSPN with finite position and timed transi-
tion is isomorphic to a one-dimensional continuous-time Mar-
kov chain.23 To describe the fault-maintenance process of a
complex system, the dynamic operation of an actual systemis simulated by marked flow in a reliability model based on
GSPN. Meanwhile, as a mathematical tool, GSPN is obtained
by establishing state equation, algebraic equation and simula-
tion, which simplifies the reliability modeling and solving pro-
cess of a complex system.
2.2. GSPN depiction of DRAS
Generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) are generally defined
as GSPN ¼ ðS;T;F;K;M;KÞ, under the condition that
S [ T – Ø, S \ T ¼ Ø, F# ðS TÞ [ ðT SÞ, and
domðFÞ [ conðFÞ ¼ S [ T.24 S ¼ fs1; s2; :::; smg is the set of
repository, T ¼ ft1; t2; ::::; tng is the set of timed transition,
and the elements in F are called arcs. K ¼ fk1; k2; . . . ; klg is
the capacity function set of repository S and W is the weight
function which connects the timed transition and the arcs of
repository. M0 is the initial identification of a system.
K ¼ fk1; k2; . . . ; kmg is the set of the average trigger rate of
the timed transition, where the reciprocal of k is the average
time delay of the timed transition. In the reliability analysis,
k is represented for failure/maintenance rate distribution of a
component. domðFÞ ¼ fxj9y : ðx; yÞ 2 Fg and
conðFÞ ¼ fxj9y : ðy; xÞ 2 Fg are the domains of definition
and range, respectively.
2.2.1. Assumptions
Assumption 1: Both the failing and repairing times of each
component in DRAS can be represented by the exponential
distribution.
Assumption 2: HAS is the main actuation system to drive
the rudder, while EHAS is the backup system. Once HAS fails,
EHAS replaces HAS and drives the control surface. HAS will
take over once it is repaired.
Assumption 3: FMD is used to detect failures in both HAS
and EHAS. The isolation and switching of redundancy config-
uration are executed once FMD detects the faults. FMD is
assumed to have limited fault monitoring coverage and false
alarming probability in DRAS.
2.2.2. Definitions
Definition 1: The GSPN-based reliability models of HAS and
EHAS are described as:
GSPNHAS ¼ ðSHAS;THAS;FHAS;KHAS;WHAS;MHAS0;KHASÞ
ð1Þ
GSPNEHAS¼ðSEHAS;TEHAS;FEHAS;KEHAS;WEHAS;MEHAS0;KEHASÞ ð2Þ
Definition 2: The GSPN-based model of the DRAS in an
ideal situation without FMD is described as:
GSPNIDEAL ¼ GSPNHAS [GSPNEHAS [GSPNDRAS ð3Þ
Definition 3: The integrated GSPN model of the DRAS
with FMD is described as:
GSPNINT¼ GSPNIDEAL [GSPNFMD ð4Þ
where GSPNFMD is:
GSPNFMD ¼ ðSF;TF;FF;KF;WF;MF0;KFÞ ð5Þ2.2.3. Model description
In order to effectively describe the operational/failed status of
components and subsystems, we define SHAS ¼ fHSup;HSdn;
Fig. 3 GSPN model of HA performance degradation process.
Fig. 4 CTMC model of HA performance degradation process.
804 S. Wang et al.HAeup;HAedn;HASup;HASdng as the marking vector of
GSPNHAS. The elements in SHAS describe the operational
and failed states of HS, the equal functional and equal failed
states of HA, and the operational and failed states of HAS.
The initial states of SHAS are defined as
MHAS0 ¼ f1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0g which indicates that HAS and its
components are all operational. Here, #(HSup) = 1 indicates
that the hydraulic source is normal, and #(HSdn) = 1 indicates
that a fault has occurred in the HS. The detailed description of
each element in SHAS is provided in Section 2.2.4.
KHAS ¼ f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g defines the capacity of each element
in SHAS. THASt ¼ ftHAS1; tHAS2; tHAS3; tHAS4g is the timed transi-
tion set of GSPNHAS, and defines all dynamic failing/repair
processes of each component in HAS. The transition rate set
associated with THASt is KHAS ¼ fkHS; lHS; kHA; lHAg. The ele-
ments in KHAS represent for the failure rate of HS, the repair
rate of HS, the failure rate of HA, and the repair rate of
HA, respectively. The immediate transition set
THASit ¼ ftHASi1; tHASi2; tHASi3g is defined in GSPNHAS to
describe logical judgment processes, which take less time than
the timed transitions. The dynamic transition behavior can
then be described as THAS ¼ THASt [ THASit, and
THASt \ THASit ¼ Ø. FHAS is the arc set of the model, and the
values of the arc set WHAS are all 1.
The purpose of the EHAS is to serve as a back-up system to
the HAS. It has three operating states – normal, failure, and
back-up. We define SEHAS ¼ fESup;ESdn;EHAeup;
EHAedn;EHASup;EHASdn;EHASbpg as the marking vector
of EHAS. The elements in SEHAS describe the operational
and failed states of ES, the equal functional and equal failed
states of EHA, and the operational, failed, and back-up states
of EHAS. KEHAS ¼ f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g is the capacity set of the
elements in SEHAS. Depending on the states transition pro-
cesses in EHAS, we define the time dependent transition set
of EHAS as TEHASt ¼ ftEHAS1; tEHAS2; tEHAS3; tEHAS4g, and the
transition rate set associated with TEHASt as
KEHAS ¼ fkES; lES; kEHA; lEHAg. The elements in KEHAS repre-
sent the failure rate of ES, the repair rate of ES, the failure rate
of EHA, and the repair rate of EHA, respectively. The imme-
diate transition set is defined as TEHASit¼ tEHASi1;tEHASi2;tEHASi3f g,
and it represents the logical judgment between markings in
EHAS. Here, TEHAS¼TEHASt[TEHASit and TEHASt\TEHASit¼Ø.
FEHAS is the arc set and the values of the arc set WEHAS
are all 1. The logical relationship between HAS and
EHAS of DRAS is active-standby. GSPNDRAS is used to
describe the DRAS model, and the marking vector
SDRAS¼fDRASup;DRASdng represents the operational and
failed states of DRAS. SIDEAL¼SDRAS[SHAS[SEHAS describes
the state space of DRAS in an ideal situation with no FMD.
The initial state of the system is MDRAS0¼f1;0g, and the
capacity vector of each marking is KDRAS¼f1;1g.
For the purpose of performance analysis of FMD, the
marking set Sd ¼ fHASud;HASfd;EHASud;EHASfd;HASnfa;
HASfa;EHASnfa;EHASfag is used to express whether a fault
of HAS and/or EHAS is detected or isolated and whether a
false alarm has occurred. The marking set
Sv ¼ fHAS:vup;EHAS:vupg is defined to describe if HAS/
EHAS has a normal detection signal. SINT ¼ SHAS [ SEHAS[
SDRAS [ Sd [ Sv represents the integral state space of DRAS
with FMD2.2.4. GSPN model of DRAS
(1) GSPN model analysis of HAS
According to the fault behavior analysis of HA and EHA
described in Section 2.1, HA is a position closed-loop control
system where fault behaviors include both direct failure pro-
cess and progressive failure process caused by the performance
degradation of components. The resulting HA’s GSPN model,
based on performance degradation, is shown in Fig. 3.
According to the GSPN model, in Fig. 3, HA can function
normally in the initial condition, i.e., #(HAup) = 1. After a
period of time tHA1, HA may encounter DFM with a probabil-
ity of PðtHAi4Þ, and then a token is transmitted directly from
HAup to HAdn. The failure that HA may encounter could also
be a GFM with a probability of PðtHAi1Þ, and then HA is con-
sidered to be in the light failure state (HAlf). Here,
PðtHAi4Þ þ PðtHAi1Þ ¼ 1. The transfer rate of the timed transi-
tion tHA1 is k1, and then PðtHAi4Þk1 describes the failure rate
of HA from a normal operating state to complete failure, while
PðtHAi1Þk1 describes the failure rate of HA from a normal oper-
ating state to a light failure state. As the operational time is
increasing, HA may encounter further performance degrada-
tion until down (HAdn), or after a light failure state (HAlf), a
middle failure state (HAmf) token is directly transmitted to
HAdn with a probability of PðtHAi5Þ or PðtHAi6Þ. Here,
PðtHAi5Þ þ PðtHAi2Þ ¼ 1 and PðtHAi6Þ þ PðtHAi3Þ ¼ 1.
temp iði ¼ 1; 2; 3Þ represent temporary states in GSPN model-
ing of the HA performance degradation process. The failed
HA will be repaired after transition tHA5 where the transfer rate
is l.
It can be seen from Fig. 3 that the GSPN model of the HA
performance degradation process has five steady states: work-
ing normally, the light failure state, the middle failure state, the
serious failure state, and complete failure. If we use numbers 0,
1, 2, 3, and 4 to represent the five states, then the continuous-
time Markov chain (CTMC) model of HA, which is equivalent
to the GSPN model, can be represented as shown in Fig. 4.
Modeling of reliability and performance assessment of a dissimilar redundancy actuation system with failure monitoring 805The probability of state transfer is shown on the edge between
two nodes in Fig. 4. PðtHAitÞ represents the probability of an
immediate timed transition, ki represents the failure rate of dif-
ferent degraded HA, and l represents the maintenance rate
from a complete failure state to a functional state.
According to the CTMC model shown in Fig. 4, the state
transition equation is obtained as:Table 2 Parameters of the HA model.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
PðtHAi1Þ 0.9 PðtHAi2Þ 0.8
PðtHAi3Þ 0.6 PðtHAi4Þ 0.1
PðtHAi5Þ 0.2 PðtHAi6Þ 0.4
ki ði ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4Þ (h) 5:2 104 l (h) 6:8 104
_P0ðtÞ
_P1ðtÞ
_P2ðtÞ
_P3ðtÞ
_P4ðtÞ
2
6666664
3
7777775
¼
PHAi1k1  PHAi4k1 0 0 0 l
P1k1 PHAi2k2  PHAi5k2 0 0 0
0 PHAi2k2 PHAi3k3  PHAi6k3 0 0
0 0 PHAi3k3 k4 0
PHAi4k1 PHAi5k2 PHAi6k3 k4 l
2
6666664
3
7777775
P0ðtÞ
P1ðtÞ
P2ðtÞ
P3ðtÞ
P4ðtÞ
2
6666664
3
7777775
ð6ÞThe initial condition is:
P0ð0Þ
P1ð0Þ
P2ð0Þ
P3ð0Þ
P4ð0Þ
2
6666664
3
7777775
¼
1
0
0
0
0
2
6666664
3
7777775
ð7Þ
The steady probabilities of these states of HA can be
obtained as follows:
P0 ¼ lk2k3k4G
P1 ¼ lPHAi1k1k3k4G
P2 ¼ lPHAi1k1PHAi2k2k4G
P3 ¼ lPHAi1k1PHAi2k2PHAi3k3G
P4 ¼ k1k2k3k4G
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð8Þ
where G ¼ k1k2k3k4 þ lk2k3k4 þ lPHAi1k1k3k4 þ lPHAi1k1
PHAi2k2k4 þ lPHAi1k1PHAi2k2PHAi3k3.
The HA can still fulfill its function in the all four states 0, 1,
2, and 3, so the equivalent operational probability of HA (Peup)
and the equivalent failure probability of HA (Pedn) are:
Peup ¼ P0 þ P1 þ P2 þ P3
Pedn ¼ P4

ð9Þ
In order to facilitate the reliability analysis, the failure and
repair process can be equivalent to a transition between an
operational state and a failure state. The simplified GSPN
model is shown in Fig. 5.Fig. 5 Simplified GSPN model of HA.According to the GSPN structure in Fig. 5, the equivalent
operational probability of HA is:
Peup ¼ leke þ le
ð10Þ
where le ¼ l. Accordingly, the equivalent failure rate of HA
is:ke ¼ 1 Peup
Peup
 l ð11Þ
The parameters of the HA model, the values of failure rate
kiði ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4Þ, and the maintenance rate l, according to Li
et al.25 are provided in Table 2. The probability of HA’s imme-
diate timed transition is assumed based on experience. The
value of ke can then be calculated from Eqs. (9)-(11) as
ke  1:7 104 ð12Þ
Combined with the failure process of HS, the dynamic
GSPN model of the HAS can be established as shown in
Fig. 6.
As indicated in Fig. 6, the hydraulic actuator (HA) and the
hydraulic power supply (HS) can operate normally in the ini-
tial condition, #(HAeup) = 1, #(HSup) = 1, and #(HASup)
= 1. When the timed transition tHAS1 is triggered, the operat-
ing state of HS is changed from a normal working state to a
failure state, and the triggering rate depends on the failure rate
kHS. Transition tHAS2 simulates the restoration process of HS,Fig. 6 GSPN model of HAS.
Table 3 GSPN model states of HAS.
States Description
0 Both the HS and the HA are operating, and the HAS
operates well
1 The HS fails, but the HA can still work. The HAS fails
2 The HS is working, but the HA loses its function due to
direct or gradual failure, and the HAS fails
Fig. 7 CTMC model of HAS.
Fig. 8 GSPN model for working mechanism of DRAS.
Fig. 9 GSPN model for DRAS without FMD.
806 S. Wang et al.and its triggering rate depends on the maintenance rate lHS.
The HA’s state transition principle is similar to that of the
HS, and the transition rates of tHAS3 and tHAS4 are kHA and
lHA. HASup describes the operational state of HAS, and iff
#(HSup) = 1\#(HAeup) = 1, then #(HASup) = 1, which
means that HAS can work normally when both HS and HA
are working well. HAS.dn represents the fault occurring in
HAS, and iff #(HSdn) = 1[#(HAedn) = 1, then #(HASdn)
= 1, which means that failure of either HA or HS can lead
to HAS failure.
Analysis of the reachable markings in Fig. 6 indicates that
three reachable states of HAS can be obtained as shown in
Table 3.
According to the states description of HAS in Table 3, the
CTMC model equivalent to HAS’s GSPN model is shown in
Fig. 7. In Fig. 7, states 0, 1, and 2 of HAS are described as
in Table 3. The probability of state transferring is shown on
the edge between two states. The sum of probability of one
state transferring to another state or remaining in its state is
1. In Fig. 7, k represents the failure rate and l stands for the
maintenance rate.
Based on the CTMC model of the HAS, the state transition
equation is obtained as:
_P0ðtÞ
_P1ðtÞ
_P2ðtÞ
2
64
3
75 ¼
ðkHS þ kHAÞ kHS kHA
lHS lHS 0
lHA 0 lHA
2
64
3
75
T
P0ðtÞ
P1ðtÞ
P2ðtÞ
2
64
3
75 ð13Þ
where PiðtÞ is the probability of state i.
The initial condition is:
½P0ð0Þ P1ð0Þ P2ð0Þ ¼ ½1 0 0 ð14ÞThe result for HAS’s reliability can be obtained accord-
ingly. The steady state availability of HAS is:
P ¼ lim
t!1
P0ðtÞ ¼ lim
s!0
s  1
sþs kHSsþlHSþ
kHA
sþlHA
 
¼ 1þ kHSlHS þ
kHA
lHA
 1 ð15Þ
Given the transition rate values in Eq. (15),
kHS ¼ 2 104=h, kHA ¼ ke ¼ 1:7 104=h, lHS ¼ 7:2
104=h, and lHA ¼ le ¼ 6:8 104=h.25 The steady state avail-
ability is determined to be 0.6545.
The EHAS serves as the back-up system for HAS. If EHAS
malfunctions and is subsequently repaired, the state of EHAS
will be transferred from the fault state to the back-up state.
That is, there will be three states for EHAS in the DRAS
model: working, fault, and back-up. The GSPN model which
describes the dynamic failure process of EHAS is similar to
the HAS model, and will be shown in DRAS modeling.
(2) GSPN reliability model for the ideal DRAS without
FMD
The working mechanism of DRAS is cold backup. In the
beginning, HAS is working, and EHAS is in the back-up
Table 4 GSPN model parameters of EHAS.25
Parameter Value Meaning
kES 1.0  104/h The triggering rate of time transition tEHAS1 and also the failure rate of ES
lES 7.1  104/h The triggering rate of time transition tEHAS2 and also the maintenance rate of ES
kEHA 1.3  104/h The triggering rate of time transition tEHAS4 and also the equivalent failure rate of EHA
lEHA 7.3  104/h The triggering rate of time transition tEHAS4 and also the maintenance rate of EHA
Table 5 Accessible states and steady-state probability of the ideal DRAS reliability model.
State HSup HAup ESup EHAup HASup EHASup EHASbp DRASup DRASdn Probability
M0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.621248
M1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.13812
M2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.011624
M3 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.150389
M4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.014404
M5 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.02074
M6 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.015666
M7 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.012338
M8 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.015471
Modeling of reliability and performance assessment of a dissimilar redundancy actuation system with failure monitoring 807mode, and DRAS is functioning well, thus: #(HASup) = 1, #
(DRASup) = 1, and #(EHASbp) = 1. If HAS fails and
EHAS is in the normal backup state, EHAS resumes the func-
tion of the failed HAS to drive the rudder. In this case,
EHASbp is marked with a token, and DRAS is still function-
ing. If EHAS also fails, DRAS loses it function completely,
expressed as iff #(HASdn) = 1\#(EHASdn) = 1, and #
(DRASdn) = 1. When EHAS is repaired, it returns to the
back-up state, and EHASbp regains the token. The working
mechanism logic of DRAS can be demonstrated by GSPN
shown in Fig. 8.
To correctly clarify the relations between component fail-
ure, subsystem failure, and overall DRAS failure, we can set
up a reliability model for an ideal condition with no failure
monitoring devices, as shown in Fig. 9.
Since the model is very complex compared to the GSPN
model of HAS, computer simulation is adopted to solve the
problem. Model parameters for EHAS are given in Table 4.
When we operate the model in Fig. 9 and 86 states can be
accessed, 9 of which have effective tokens, as shown in Table 5.
In Table 5, M0 indicates that all components in both HAS
and EHAS are in proper service. StatesM1 andM3 represent a
failure in HAS due to an HS or HA fault, but all components
in EHAS work well, so DRAS runs normally. States M2, M4,
M6, and M7 indicate that some have failed in both the HAS
and EHAS, thus leading to overall system failure. States M5
and M8 indicate that HAS is in service, while EHAS is in the
repair state due to ES or EHA failure, and the system is still
operating.
It can be concluded from the above description that states
M0, M1, M3, M5, and M8 denote the normal operating state
of DRAS, so availability of the system is described as:
P ¼ PðM0Þ þ PðM1Þ þ PðM3Þ
þPðM5Þ þ PðM8Þ ¼ 0:945968
ð16Þ
In comparison with the availability of a single HAS in Sec-
tion 2.2.4 (1), the adoption of the dissimilar redundancy work-
ing mode (EHAS) can highly improve the availability of the
DRAS.(3) Comprehensive GSPN model taking FMD’s monitoring
coverage probability and false alarm probability into
account in DRAS
In the ideal model in Fig. 9, when HAS fails and EHAS is in
the back-up state, the system will immediately switch to EHAS
to drive the control surface; if the EHAS also breaks down,
and the fault in HAS is not fixed, the DRAS will be considered
to be in the failure status. In an actual DRAS, the HAS chan-
nel requires a fault monitoring device to check whether failure
occurs and then makes transition when failure is detected. In
the same way, EHAS also needs to be equipped with a moni-
toring device to detect and determine whether the system fails
and then takes possible remedial actions. Affected by factors
related to the system complexity and FMD reliability, the
devices have certain indicators such as monitoring coverage
probability and false alarm probability. If failure cannot be
accurately detected, then potential failure and hazard states
may result. Therefore, to better describe actual situations, a
GSPN dynamic reliability model considering FMD perfor-
mance is developed and presented in this paper. The system
is shown in Fig. 10.
In the model in Fig. 10, instantaneous transitions tHASi5,
tEHASi5, tHASi4, and tEHASi4, containing probability, represent
the failure monitoring coverage probability and the fault
missed detection probability of FMD, and PðtHASi4Þþ
PðtHASi5Þ ¼ 1;PðtEHASi4Þ þ PðtEHASi5Þ ¼ 1. The states #(HASfd)
and #(EHASfd) indicate that failures are successfully detected,
and the states #(HASud) and #(EHASud) represent unde-
tected/false failures. Instant transitions tHASi7 and tEHASi7 indi-
cate that FMD has reported false alarms, while tHASi6 and
tEHASi6 indicate that FMD can correctly identify DRAS work-
ing states, and PðtHASi6Þ þ PðtHASi7Þ ¼ 1;PðtEHASi6Þþ
PðtEHASi7Þ ¼ 1. The states #(HASfa) and #(EHASfa) indicate
existences of false alarms in the system, and the state #
(HASnfa) and #(EHASnfa) indicate that token false alarms
have not occurred. The states #(HASvup) and #(EHASvup)
stand for HAS/EHAS running well from the view of
the signal.
Fig. 10 Comprehensive GSPN model of an actual DRAS considering FMD performance.
808 S. Wang et al.Various system states can be seen from the GSPN model of
an actual DRAS considering FMD performance
 When HAS fails, i.e., #(HASdn) = 1, the failure can be
detected by FMD with a probability of PðtHASi5Þ, and then
#(HASfd) = 1, #(HASvdn) = 1; therefore, DRAS switches
to EHAS.
 Alternately, if the failure is not detected with a probability
of P ðtHASi4Þ, then #(HASud) = 1, #(HASvup) = 1, and
DRAS mistakenly regards HAS as functioning normally,
without switching, so the DRAS is in danger.
 When HAS fails, i.e., #(HASdn) = 1\#(HASfd) = 1\#
(HASvdn) = 1\#(EHASbp) = 1, then EHAS is activated.
As time passes by, if EHAS fails, that is, #(EHASdn) = 1,
the failure is detected at a probability of PEHASi5, and then
#(EHASfd) = 1, #(EHASvdn) = 1, and #(DRASdn) = 1,
so the control surface driven by this DRAS is invalidated,
and the flight control system will take measures for isolation
and remediation.
 Alternately, if the EHAS failure is not detected at a proba-
bility of PEHASi4, then #(EHASud) = 1 and #(EHASvup)
= 1, so the DRAS is running at risk.
 During EHAS failure, if HAS is fixed, then DRAS switches
back to HAS. When false alarms have not occurred in HAS,
#(HASnfa) = 1, #(HASvup) = 1, and #(DRASup) = 1. If a false alarm occurs in HAS, then #(HASfa) = 1, #
(HASvdn) = 1, and #(DRASdn) = 1, so DRAS identifies
a failure by wrong determination, thus reducing
availability.
 Similarly, when false alarms happen while EHAS is run-
ning, then #(EHASvdn) = 1 and #(DRASdn) = 1.
Assuming that the monitoring coverage probabilities of
FMD in HAS and EHAS are PðtHASi5Þ ¼ PðtEHASi5Þ ¼ 0:9
and that the fault alarm probabilities of FMD in HAS
and EHAS are PðtHASi7Þ ¼ PðtEHASi7Þ ¼ 0:05, we have 496
accessible tokens, 36 of which have valid states, as shown
in Table 6.
Analysis of DRAS accessible states provided in Table 6
reveals the following:
 State M0 indicates that HAS is in the normal service and is
correctly detected, EHAS is in the proper backup standby
mode, and DRAS is functioning well, which is the
desired/ideal system state.
 States M8 and M13 indicate that HAS is in the normal ser-
vice and is correctly detected, but EHAS fails, with failure
being detected and repaired (ES or EHA failure respec-
tively), and at this moment, DRAS is functioning, but with
degraded redundancy.
Table 6 Accessible states in the comprehensive GSPN model of DRAS considering FMD performance.
State HSup HAup HASup HASfd HASnfa HASvup ESup EHAup EHASup EHASfd EHASnfa EHASvup EHASbp DRASup Probability
M0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.564567
M1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.131395
M2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.117153
M3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.014987
M4 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.025388
M5 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.004014
M6 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.012722
M7 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.013891
M8 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.017583
M9 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.010843
M10 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.002825
M11 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.002041
M12 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.009426
M13 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.013028
M14 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.017346
M15 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.008135
M16 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.002086
M17 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.002503
M18 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.000278
M19 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.002298
M20 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.009725
M21 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.000217
M22 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.000166
M23 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.008361
M24 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.002438
M25 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.000445
M26 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.000545
M27 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.000246
M28 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.002983
M29 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.000422
M30 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.000204
M31 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.00029
M32 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.000234
M33 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.000156
M34 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.00079
M35 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.00027
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Table 7 Comparison of three system availability based on the
GSPN model.
System HAS Ideal DRAS
without FMD
DRAS considering
Pm and Pfa
Availability 0.6545 0.945968 0.895335
Fig. 11 Relationship between the working state probability and
the monitoring coverage probability.
810 S. Wang et al. State M23 indicates that HAS is working properly and is
correctly detected, and EHAS is in normal service, but false
alarms lead to judgment that DRAS is unavailable, hence
DRAS is in redundancy degradation.
 States M15 and M20 indicate that HAS is in normal service
and correct detection, and EHAS is in the back-up status,
but a fault actually exists in EHAS, without being detected
by FMD, so it is in invalid backup, and DRAS is in redun-
dancy degradation.
 States M1 and M2 indicate that HAS fails and is identified
by FMD (HA or HS failure respectively), and then the sys-
tem enters EHAS, functioning well, so by the time system
redundancy is downgraded.
 State M4 indicates that HAS is working well but makes
false alarm and gets isolation, and then the system switches
to EHAS, in degraded redundancy.
To combine the above six scenarios and nine states, the
functioning probability (PA) of DRAS can be worked out,
which represents the DRAS availability.
PA ¼
X
i
PðMiÞ ¼ 0:895335
i ¼ 0; 1; 2; 4; 8; 13; 15; 20; 23
8<
: ð17Þ
Further analysis of DRAS accessible states provided in
Table 6 reveals the following:
 States M6, M7, M9, and M12 indicate that HAS is in mal-
function and is detected, and DRAS transits to EHAS,
which is in failure and is detected, so DRAS is in the normal
failure state.
 States M24 and M28 indicate that HAS is in malfunction
and is detected, and DRAS switches to EHAS when it is
working properly but reports false alarms, so DRAS is in
the normal failure state.
 States M5 and M10 indicate that HAS is functioning well
but its false alarm makes it blocked, and DRAS activates
EHAS that fails and is detected, so DRAS breaks down.
 State M34 indicates that HAS is normal but it reports false
alarms and gets isolated, so DRAS selects EHAS which
functions well but reports false alarm, so DRAS fails.
In all of the above-mentioned four scenarios and nine
states, DRAS cannot operate normally, and gives alarms.
Therefore, the system failure probability, also known as
unavailability (PUA), can be determined as follows
PUA ¼
X
i
PðMiÞ ¼ 0:059932
i ¼ 5; 6; 7; 9; 10; 12; 24; 28; 34
8<
: ð18Þ
Further analysis of DRAS accessible states provided in
Table 6 reveals the following:
 States M25 and M26 indicate that HAS is in good condition
but it alarms falsely and is isolated, EHAS is selected but
faults occur in EHAS (due to separate failures of ES and
EHA) and are not detected, and the detection system is
under impression that DRAS is functioning well, but in fact
it is in the hazard state. StatesM11,M16,M17, andM19 indicate that HAS has faults
(HS and HA failures respectively) which are detected and
blocked, EHAS transfers to a working state, which is in a
failure state (ES and EHA failures respectively) and is unde-
tected, and the monitoring system is under impression that
DRAS is in a good working condition, but it is actually in
the hazard state.
 States M3;M14;M18;M21;M22;M27;M29;M3033;M35 reflect
that HAS is in problem but is not spotted by FMD, so
the DRAS is in the hazard state.
To summarize, the incidence rate of hazard states (PD) is:
PD ¼
X
i
PðMiÞ ¼ 0:044733;
i ¼ 3; 14; 18; 21; 22; 27; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33; 35
ð19Þ
The above results are consistent with the analysis in Sec-
tion 2.1. A comparison provided in Table 7 indicates that
the introduction of FMD may leave the system in danger. In
addition, the system reliability with FMD’s monitoring cover-
age probability and false alarm probability taken into account
is lower than that in an ideal situation (without FMD). The
analytical results correspond to system behaviors observed in
practice.6
3. Analysis of impact of FMD performance on DRAS reliability
and safety
According to the reliability analysis models, the reliability out-
come is often higher than the actual value because there is no
consideration of impact of FMD performance on system reli-
ability. However, if the performance of FMD is too poor, it
will cause potential danger to the system by drastically lower-
ing the system reliability. Hence, the effects of FMD perfor-
mance on system reliability need to be studied.
Fig. 12 Relationship between the dangerous state probability,
the failure state probability, and the monitoring coverage
probability.
Fig. 13 Relationship between the working state probability and
the false alarm probability.
Fig. 14 Relationship between the dangerous state probability,
the failure state probability, and the false alarm probability.
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on DRAS
Assuming that the false alarm probability is
PðtHASi7Þ ¼ PðtEHASi7Þ ¼ 0:05, and by simulating the model
shown in Fig. 10, we can determine how the probabilities of
the working, hazard, and failure states of the EHAS change
with the monitoring coverage probability, as shown in Figs. 11
and 12.
At a given false alarm probability of PðtHASi7Þ ¼
PðtEHASi7Þ ¼ 0:05, we use the least squares method to fit the
numerical data, Fig.11, and the resulting relationship is given
by PA ¼ 0:2869Pm þ 0:6384, where Pm is monitoring coverage
probability andPA is availability of integralDRAS.We can con-
clude that by improving the monitoring coverage probability by
1%, the availability of DRAS would increase by 0.29%.
In addition, we have applied the least squares method to fit
the numerical data in Fig. 12, and the relationship between the
dangerous state probability (PD) in DRAS and the monitoring
coverage probability (Pm) is PD ¼ 0:4158Pm þ 0:4172, while
the relationship between the failure state probability (PUA) in
DRAS and the monitoring coverage probability is
PUA ¼ 0:1289Pm  0:0556. We can conclude that by improving
the monitoring coverage probability by 1%, the probability of
DRAS’s dangerous state would decrease by 0.42%, while the
unavailability would increase by 0.13%.
From Figs. 11 and 12, it can be observed that as the mon-
itoring coverage probability increases, potential faults in the
system can be gradually identified and isolated, and the system
reliability can be improved. At the same time, since the faults
are easier to identify, the possibility of danger from missed
detection is substantially reduced, and the failure rate
increases.
3.2. Impact analysis of FMD’s false alarm probability on DRAS
Assuming that the monitoring coverage probability is
PðtHASi5Þ ¼ PðtEHASi5Þ ¼ 0:9, we can determine how the proba-
bilities of the working, dangerous, and failure states of DRAS
change with the false alarm probability, as shown in Figs. 13
and 14.
Assuming that the monitor coverage probability is
PðtHASi5Þ ¼ PðtEHASi5Þ ¼ 0:9, we can apply the least squaresmethod to fit the numerical data in Fig. 13. The function in
Fig. 13 is PA ¼ 0:3526Pfa þ 0:9130. Pfa is the false alarm
probability and PA is the availability of integral DRAS. We
can observe that 1% degradation of the false alarm probability
increases the availability of DRAS by 0.35%.
From Fig. 14, the relationship between the failure state
probability (PUA) of DRAS and the false alarm probability
(Pfa) can be described as PUA ¼ 0:3290Pfa þ 0:0436, and the
relationship between the dangerous state probability (PD)
and the false alarm probability is PD ¼ 0:0239Pfa þ 0:0434.
We can observe that 1% degradation in the false alarm prob-
ability decreases the unreliability of DRAS by 0.33% and the
probability of a dangerous state of DRAS would decrease by
0.02%.
It is observed from Figs. 13 and 14 that as the false alarm
probability is increasing, the misjudgment rate in the working
state increases, hence the components cannot be fully used
within a life span, so the reliability drops and the failure rate
increases. Alternately, the probability of states M25 and M26
will increase as the false alarm probability increases, thus fur-
ther leading to a rising possibility of the hazard state.
4. Conclusions
This paper has established a reliability model with GSPN based
on the analysis of DRAS architecture and its characteristics.
812 S. Wang et al.The paper has presented a study of different system states and
transition relations, and discussed the impacts of the monitor-
ing coverage rate and the false alarm rate of failure monitoring
devices on system reliability. The major findings are as follows:
(1) The explicit performance degrading processes and fault
sequences as well as different redundancy monitoring
transition strategies and potential faults have significant
effects on DRAS. Reliability modeling for DRAS based
on GSPN can clearly describe the dynamic redundancy
degradation and state transitions process.
(2) The dissimilar redundant working mode can greatly
improve the availability of a large aircraft actuation sys-
tem compared to a single HAS. In a dissimilar redun-
dancy actuation system, HS/ES and HA/EHA make
DRAS experience significant redundancy and perfor-
mance degradation processes between normal and fault
states. The dissimilar system architecture and redun-
dancy transition strategies give better understanding of
the reliability advantages of DRAS.
(3) Due to the limitations of FMD in DRAS, there are cir-
cumstances when system failure cannot be accurately
detected or a well-functioning system is reported with
false alarms. If a fault is not detected, the system will
be in a potentially hazardous situation. In the DRAS
reliability model, as presented, an increase of the moni-
toring coverage rate and a reduction of the false alarm
rate would reduce the probability for the system entering
a dangerous state.
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that focus-
ing only on redundancy when designing a redundant system is
not sufficient and more attention should be paid to improving
the failure monitoring devices and designing improved failure
monitoring plans. However, this means an increase in the cost
of design, so in system design, all comprehensive factors
should be taken into account and reasonable design parame-
ters should be selected.
Therefore, when designing a redundancy system, caution
should be taken when designing and testing FMD perfor-
mance. The GSPN model set up in this paper can serve as
an accurate reliability assessment for an airplane DRAS, and
can also be readily applied in reliability modeling and analysis
for other electromechanical systems.
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